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Abstract
After a generalmapping of the different understandings of affect, this article focuses on twoaspects of aDeleuze-Guattarian
understanding of affect which are of particular relevance for media and communication studies. The first is understand-
ing affect as potential. It is through the forces of encounter that bodies are affected and that these affections then can
be turned into action, into their capacity to affect. The second is understanding the perpetual becoming that takes place
through continual encounters between bodies; with each encounter, the body changes, however slightly and subtly. The
concept of assemblage that allows one to grasp these dynamics and complexities is discussed as an approach towards a
much more complex theoretical grounding for processes of agency and power. Working with affect in media and commu-
nication studies, a three-fold strategy will be presented: to analyse how media generate affects and capitalise on them;
to analyse what media do—in the sense of mobilizing potential; to analyse phenomena of mediated communication as
assemblages. The article ends with challenges and new paths for conducting research on affect.
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1. Introduction
Jennifer Daryl Slack has already reminded media and
communication scholars that we “are living through an
extraordinary moment”, a moment characterized by ma-
jor transformations that change the conditions of our ex-
istence (Slack, 2012, p. 143). These transformations are
produced by new forms of connections between struc-
tures, practices, materials, affects, and enunciations;
challenging what has become accepted as key questions
in communication studies—what Slack summarizes as
transmission,modes, andmedia. For Slack, these concep-
tualisations are unable to grasp what emerges in these
new arrangements of heterogeneous elements. She ar-
gues that we “must be willing to respond to changing
conditions of existence with theoretical tools that both
respond to and constitute communication in new ways,
with new ways of conceiving its object(s) of analysis”
(Slack, 2012, p. 143). Affect theory is such a theoretical
tool. The recent ‘turn to affect’ in the humanities and so-
cial sciences is an attempt to theorize contemporary for-
mations of the social (Clough & Halley, 2007; Gregg &
Seigworth, 2010). There seems to be broad agreement
that one reason for the current turn to affect theory is
due to the limitations of cognitive approaches. The ‘lin-
guistic turn’, as well as the ‘discursive’ and the ‘cultural
turn’ in the humanities and social sciences, resulted in
constructivist and post-structuralist models of the sub-
ject. They displaced ideas of the unified, autonomous
subject, whose actions are rationally grounded, with a
more complex understanding of the contingencies of
historic-specific subject positions and the interpellations
of dominant discourses. However, anything else that was
not socially constructed—that is the material, and the
affective—had been left out (Bauer, Binswanger, Häber-
lein, Nay, & Zimmermann, 2014, p. 12; see also Hem-
mings, 2015, p. 147).
Clare Hemmings (2015, p. 147) sees a second strand
of arguments which expresses doubt regarding “the
methodological capacity of both quantitative empirical
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approaches and textual analysis to account for the fullest
resonance of the socialwordwewish to understand”. Eve
Sedgwick (2003, p. 17), for example, uses the term “tex-
ture” to characterise the embodied experience of the so-
cial world. This includes questions such as what moves
people and what attracts them. Sedgwick is hesitant of
the capacity of critical theory with its focus on struc-
tures of truth and knowledge—she characterizes criti-
cal theory as “hermeneutic of suspicion” and “paranoid
theory”—which makes critical theory uninventive and
not equipped for the surprising and enlivening texture
of individuality and community (see Hemmings, 2005,
p. 553). A third argument, according to Hemmings (2015,
p. 148), is the doubt regarding whether or not binaries
such as power/resistance or public/private are still appro-
priate for our understanding of social and political pro-
cesses; there is a need for increased attention to ‘struc-
tures of attachment’.
2. The Many Lives of Affect
To fully elucidate the different understandings and uses
of affect/emotion, it is helpful to grasp what Clare Hem-
ming calls “[t]he many lives of affect” (Hemmings, 2015,
p. 147). The answer to the question “what is affect?”
is rather easy in psychology and neurology: affects are
about emotional states, sometimes this comprises every
aspect of emotion, sometimes it only refers to physio-
logical, bodily activities (such as blushing, arousal level,
etc.) as differentiated from “feelings” as subjective expe-
riences (Wetherell, 2012, p. 2). In addition, there is an-
other, ‘wilder’, broader notion of affect which refers to
process and force in a more general sense as Wetherell
(2012, p. 2), for example, points out.
Broadly speaking, there are two different approaches
to affect. One is based on American psychologist Silvan
Tomkins who places affect within the individual; that
is embodied affect. The other is grounded in philoso-
pher Baruch Spinoza and the ways in which his concepts
have been used by Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and aca-
demics who draw on their work. This is a quite different
understanding of affect as apersonal, as a force. In both
approaches, affect is seen as the primary motivator and
force in human life—but how this works is theorized and
conceptualized differently.
Tomkins, who was strongly influenced by Charles
Darwin, turns away from psychoanalytic approaches
where affect is understood as acting in the service of
drives (for a good overview see Hemmings, 2005, p.
521) and instead proposes “that affect is free from the
constraints of both drives and social meanings” (Hem-
mings, 2005, p. 559). Affects have their own complex,
self-referential lives. Affects can be attached to anything
(things, people, ideas, relations, activities, other affects)
and these attachments cannot be predicted (Hemmings,
2005, p. 559). According to Tomkins, we all develop com-
plex “affect theories”, which are the affective experi-
ences that we remember in the moment of responding
to a new situation (Hemmings, 2005, p. 552). What is key
for Tomkins is that he sees his concept as an alternative
to social determinism, so that the individual is not just
passively responding to cognitive and learned phenom-
ena (Hemmings, 2005, p. 552).
For Tomkins, affects are innate. He proposes nine ge-
netically programmed, universal affects, thus opposing
positions which describe human affects as culturally spe-
cific. For the nine affects he used a range name to indi-
cate their different intensities (influenced by system the-
ory; see Angerer, 2014, p. 402). He also groups them
in positive, neutral, and negative affects. The positive
ones are interest-excitement, enjoyment-joy; neutral is
surprise-startle; negative is distress-anguish, anger-rage,
fear-terror, shame-humiliation, disgust (reaction to nox-
ious tastes) and dissmell (reaction to noxious odours). In
Tomkins’ complex theory of the human affect, one of his
basic assumptions is: “[a]ffects are the primary motiva-
tors of human behaviour. While drives and cognitions
both have motivational power, it is only when they are
amplified by affect that a human being is moved to act”
(Frank & Wilson, 2012, p. 875).
Although Tomkins’ approach has been used in dif-
ferent ways, I will just mention two in the context of
media and communication studies, both of which strike
out in very different directions. One is the reading of
his work by Sedgewick. She is interested in the com-
plex ways in which shame operates; this is a question
that has become prominent in feminist and queer the-
ory (e.g., Probyn, 2010), but which has also been used
in media studies—for example in research on reality TV
(e.g., Kavka, 2014).
The second way Tomkins has been used is by his stu-
dent Paul Ekman, whose research focuses on universal
recognition of affects. He developed the “Facial Action
Coding System” and presents himself as an expert in “de-
tecting micro expression”, selling his tools to institutions
such as the CIA, FBI, as well as anybody who is inter-
ested in training oneself “to catch themicro facial expres-
sions of others” (Ekman, n.d.). Ekman is particularly in-
terested in detecting lies based on facial expressions and
body language. He was, for example, the advisor for the
figure of Cal Lightman, who is presented as the world’s
most famous and successful detector of lies in the US TV-
series Lie to Me (2009–2011, Fox TV). Ekman’s work is
also essential for ‘affective computing’, the creation of
‘emphatic machines’ that are capable of recognizing and
adapting to the feelings and moods of humans (e.g., Pi-
card, 1997).
For the second strand, based on Deleuze’s reading
of Spinoza (Deleuze, 1988), affect is not “simply a per-
sonal feeling” and not “‘emotion’ in the everyday sense”
(Massumi, 2015, p. 3). Following Spinoza, “affect is the
power/capacity ‘to affect and be affected”’ (Massumi,
2015, p. ix). These capacities are not two different ca-
pacities, they “always go together” because “when you
affect something you are at the same time opening your-
self up to being affected in turn” (Massumi, 2015, p. 4).
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That means that this always results in a slight transition.
This is how Spinoza understands bodies—bodies (not
only human bodies but any bodies) are defined by their
capacities, by what they can do (and these capacities
change). So, affects are, to quote Massumi (2015, p. 6),
“ways of connecting, to others and other situations”. Af-
fect is here a force, “a force that things exert upon other
things” asMatthew Tiessen (2013, p. 13) describes it.We
can know them through their effects. As Seigworth and
Gregg (2010, p. 2) point out, force does not always mean
‘forceful’, it also can be very subtle and go almost unno-
ticed in everyday life. Affect is what is found in the in-
tensities that pass from body to body, in what circulates
between bodies (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 1). These
are visceral forces that are not conscious; they can drive
us towards movement.
So, in that sense, affect is not individual, it is always
relational; it is what happens in that in-between, in the
event. It is pre-subjective; only retrospectively can it be
‘owned’ as the content of an individualized experience.
It is also transindividual because it happens between in-
dividuals (Massumi, 2015, pp. 91, 94). This is more like
an atmosphere, a cultural mood, an aura—what it feels
like to be in a particular situation or moment. Massumi
stresses that the concept of affect is ‘transversal’ in the
sense that it cuts through realms that are usually seen
as separate—such as subjective/objective, desire/what
is given, freedom/constraint. Affect happens in the mid-
dle, the in-between; the two realms are like two facets
of the same event (Massumi, 2015, p. 48). Affect is not
the opposite of cognition. For Spinoza, body and mind
are different attributes of the same substance, an idea
that has become very popular with the publications of
neuropsychologist Antonio Damasio (1999, 2003) who
stresses the entanglement of rationality and emotion.
A Deleuze-Guattarian approach to affect is much
more promising for our attempts to get a better under-
standing of contemporary processes in mediated com-
munication. They offer a different angle that goes be-
yond the individualistic notion of affect dominating in
psychology and neurology.1 In particular, there are two
aspects of this notion of affect which are of relevance
when it comes to media and communication studies.
The first is the understanding of affect as potential. It is
through the forces of encounter that bodies are affected
and that these affections then can be shifted into action,
into the capacity to affect (Seigworth&Gregg, 2010, p. 2).
This capacity of a body to affect is, as Seigworth and
Gregg (2010, p. 3) stress, never defined by a body alone
but by the context of its force-relations. However, it is
important to point out that affect is not something that
is positive or negative per se, rather it is the question of
what an affect does, if it increases or diminishes the ca-
pacities to act, to connect.
The second is the perpetual becoming that takes
place through the continuous encounters of the bodies:
with each encounter the body changes, however slightly
and subtly. Here there is a much more complex theoreti-
cal grounding for what has now become common sense
when talking about identity and subjectivity as always
in process.
These dynamicswill be elaborated on in the next part
by referring to the actual and the virtual as two dimen-
sions of the real, as well as by focusing on the concept
of assemblage as an approach to explore and explain for-
mations in the real.
3. Reality as Continuous Processes of Becoming
With an understanding of affect as forces of encounter
and of flows, there also comes a specific understanding
of the world, of reality. Following Deleuze and Guattari
(1987),2 the world is highly complex, defined by its mul-
tiplicity, its openness and its being dynamic, with pro-
cesses of becoming continuously taking place. ‘Becom-
ing’ does not mean a process of transforming one thing
into another (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013, p. 9); rather, it
is defined by ongoing processes of “becoming otherwise
than what it already is” (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 3).
It is important though, that this does not mean becom-
ing better or progressive in the sense of developmental
theories—because we do not know in advance what a
body can do. This is a world which is not completely un-
der the control of human beings (see Colebrook, 2011,
p. 52; Grossberg, 2014, pp. 19–20).
To better grasp this complexity and dynamics, two
Deleuze-Guattarian concepts are helpful: the concept of
the virtual and actual and the concept of assemblage
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 1994). These concepts pro-
vide a deeper understanding of how particular configu-
rations of reality are produced and how power relations
work. But what makes them particularly useful is that
they focus on dynamics and flows, on potentialities, the
‘not yet’, on what is to come. This article will focus on
the concept of the assemblage because it offers a way to
a more complex analysis of what is going on.
3.1. Virtual and Actual
Deleuze and Guattari speak of the virtual and the actual
as two aspects or modalities of reality that co-exist to-
gether (Grossberg, 2014, p. 8). The virtual is not ‘virtual
reality’ in the sense of computer-generated worlds; vir-
tual should not be understood as possibility, rather as
potentiality. Deleuze and Guattari refuse ‘the possible’,
precisely because ‘the possible’ is something that is not
real, it refers to anything you can dream of, as Gross-
berg (2014, p. 8) explains; whereas the virtual is reality
1 Because ofmy focus on a Deleuze-Guattarian understanding of affect, I will not reference research on emotions, which, using a differentmethodological
and ontological approach, situates affect/emotion in the individual.
2 In my discussion of key concepts, I do not refer to the original sources in Deleuze and Guattari, but draw on the elucidating work of scholars like Ian
Buchanan, Claire Colebrook, Rebecca Coleman, Lawrence Grossberg, Tauel Harper, Jessica Ringrose, David Savat, Gregory Seigworth, Jennifer Slack, and
Macgregor Wise, whose attempts in making Deleuze’s and Guattari’s work approachable I find very stimulating for media and communication studies.
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as becoming, as pure capacity, potentiality, as the open-
ness of a non-enumerable multiplicity of actualizations;
it can be creatively manifested (actualized) in many dif-
ferent ways. Thus, reality is constantly making itself, ac-
tualizing itself, producing particular actual realities out of
and alongside the virtual as it were. The concept of the
virtual problematizes common-sense notions of imagin-
ing what is possible as being based on the actual world,
on something that has been actualized, such as, for ex-
ample, the image of the ‘modern man’. Modern man
then becomes the basis for thinking about possibilities
and differences of human life, thereby being blind to see
other not-actualized potentials for becoming as some-
thing that is quite different from the actualized world.
The virtual gives credit to the potentialities that are not
actualized, to what we might become that is entirely un-
precedented, including the concept of ‘Man’ itself (Cole-
brook, 2002, pp. xxx, xxxiv).
Grossberg (2014, p. 8) compares the virtual/actual
with quantum physics: we live in the quantum universe,
but we also live in a particular organization/actualization
of the quantum universe. The quantum universe can be
actualized in many different ways, but it is always actual-
ized. Similarly, the virtual is real (not a fiction) and also
always actualized. It continues to exist as real, alongside
any actualization. Any actualization can also be described
and characterized as an assemblage, which will always
contain its virtual potential. In their discussion of the
face, which for Deleuze andGuattari plays a key role in or-
ganizing our world, Tauel Harper and David Savat (2016,
pp. 40–41) refer to the virtual and the actual: the face
(the image) is virtual in the sense that it is a particular
surface “that opens a particular universe of action” and
“enables particular forms of experience to be actualized”
(Harper & Savat, 2016, pp. 40–41). Such an understand-
ing does not follow a traditional model of communica-
tion which focuses on questions of signifier/signified and
representation; rather we are invited to think the other
way around, asking what makes certain forms of commu-
nication possible. The concept, ‘face’, is, therefore, amul-
tiplicity of changing surface forms, each with a capacity
to be actualized; each with a capacity to affect and be af-
fected by their surrounding environment; each carrying
a certain force and intensity.
3.2. Assemblage
An assemblage is an arrangement of heterogeneous el-
ements (such as structures, practices, materials, affects,
discourses, ideas, etc.) where the parts are connected
and form connections held together by flows of desire
(DeLanda, 2011; Harper & Savat, 2016, p. 6; Slack, 2012,
p. 144). The parts of such an arrangement do not be-
long to a pre-established plan (as is the case with el-
ements of flatpack furniture), while at the same time,
this is not a totally random collection. It is the contin-
gent intersection of power relations and forces, and the
material elements in a historic specific milieu that make
an assemblage possible (Nail, 2017, p. 24; Wise, 2005,
p. 77). What defines assemblages is the relations be-
tween the elements which are the condition of an as-
semblage; it is the connections between the components
that constitute any assemblage (Harper & Savat, 2016,
p. 23; Nail, 2017, pp. 24–25) or, to quote Ian Buchanan
(2017, p. 465), an assemblage “is a relation”. Harper and
Savat (2016, p. 6) use the example of the Internet to illus-
trate that it is best to look at the Internet’s complexity as
different assemblages of desire, which can be ‘plugged’
into, each of which works differently. Take, for exam-
ple, the internet as part of a pedagogical assemblage
where the teacher or the students use the internet for re-
sources. Here the internet functions as amachine to pro-
duce information and data. The internet functions com-
pletely differentlywhen it is part of an erotic assemblage.
Whereas in both cases the internet is used for search-
ing and appraising, its functions and contents are differ-
ent in these two assemblages. Also, what it produces
is different.
Assemblages are dynamic, always in process; the
term is the English translation of the French term
‘agencement’, which refers to the process of arranging,
piecing together (Buchanan, 2017, p. 458). What is im-
portant, is that the components of an assemblage are
not fused together, they can be detached and plugged
into other assemblages. So, it is the interaction, the con-
nection between the partswhich holds an assemblage to-
gether. If these components stop interacting or no longer
are connected, the assemblage falls apart (see, for exam-
ple, the huge investment of corporations in customer loy-
alty to keep the connections alive).
Assemblages are temporary arrangements, they con-
tain the virtual potential of multiple actualizations. But
this does not mean that assemblages can become any-
thing. According to Deleuze and Guattari, there are dif-
ferent ways in which assemblages are arranged, and this
is where the politics of assemblages come into play (Nail,
2017, p. 28). There is, on the one hand, society, or more
precisely, the symbolic order with dominant formations
such as neoliberalism and global capitalism which as-
sign values to certain objects and behaviours (called pro-
cesses of coding by Deleuze and Guattari) and operate
to channel, regulate and control the flows towards cer-
tain connections. This can also work by addressing our
desires directly through commodity culture and media.
And, as we know from Foucault’s work on governmen-
tality and self-technologies, we are willing participants.
These processes are called processes of territorialisation,
which try to stabilize the identity of an assemblage (e.g.,
Colebrook, 2002, p. xxii–xxiii). On the other hand, there
are forces from the different components which Deleuze
and Guattari call machinic (see Colebrook, 2002, p. xx),
and unpredictable connections and events, which some-
times emerge as an effect of processes of territorialisa-
tion, which can change an assemblage. Here we speak of
processes of deterritorialization, which are followed by
reterritorialization—continuous processes, where forces
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allow for change while at the same time assemblages
strive to persist (Buchanan, 2017, p. 463).
One dramatic example is the suicide of Mohamad
Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, which was seen as the
catalyst of the revolution in Tunisia and the Arab spring.
Twenty-six-year-old Mouhamed Bouazizi was a street
vendor selling fruit and vegetables to support himself
and his family, who, after repeatedmistreatment and hu-
miliation by local police officers, set fire to himself on De-
cember 17, 2010. Bouazizi’s suicide sparked and intensi-
fied the demonstrations against unemployment, poor liv-
ing conditions and corruption as well as those for politi-
cal freedom, which resulted in a change of government.
The Tunisian state, a strongly territorialized assemblage,
could not function the same way any longer.
When it comes to the energy that holds assemblages
together, Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘desire’.
However, their understanding of desire differs from the
psychoanalytic understanding of desire as libidinal, as de-
fined by lack (as that which I am not or do not have).
They speak of a strive for survival that characterizes life
in general; desire is “a fundamental force of production—
everything that has life energy produces” (Harper & Sa-
vat, 2016, p. 8). Another way of characterizing desire
is the basic fact of other-directedness (a kind of affec-
tive intentionality) of life itself, an energy of connectiv-
ity. Desire is productive, it is “something that we do”
(Buchanan, 2008, p. 48, as cited in Harper & Savat, 2016,
p. 27). As Harper and Savat (2016, pp. 8–9) point out:
“[o]ur desire flows in an effort to produce and, as it flows,
it forms connections, which give rise to assemblages,
which distribute its affect”. Manuel DeLanda (2011) uses
conversation as an example for a strongly structured
(territorialized) assemblage (which comprise of embod-
ied persons, discourses, ideas, codes and rules, etc.),
where the energy that keeps the assemblage together
is attention.
Assemblages can emerge at different scales. We can
talk about assemblages on large scales such as epochs or
movements—as, for example, the Tunisian revolution, or
Zizi Papacharissi’s (2015a, 2015b) ‘affective publics’. But,
also subjectivity “can be viewed…as something that we
actively assemble and maintain, as well as being assem-
bled or arranged” (Harper & Savat, 2016, p. 22). As Mac-
gregorWise (2012, p. 159) stresses: “any assemblage we
enter into puts us into a particular relation to theworld—
promises us particular powers, redefines who we think
we are or could be”. The concept of assemblages pushes
us towards a thinking of relations and towards an under-
standing of bodies/subjects as no longer being homoge-
nous, unified bodies but as something that is always in
the process of becoming a particular body through spe-
cific connections. It is an expansion of the idea of ‘ar-
ticulation’ (as a way of avoiding causal explanations) in
Cultural Studies, as developed by Stuart Hall (e.g., Slack,
1996). Hall talks about discourse as the connection of dif-
ferent elements that can make a unity, but which also
can be re-articulated in different ways because they do
not necessarily belong together. Other connections are
always possible.
In media and communication studies, the concept of
assemblages includes the materiality of communication
and pushes us towards an understanding of media, tech-
nologies and users as no longer separate, stable agents
and an exploration of how these heterogeneous compo-
nents are woven together. What does such an assem-
blage do? What is its structure? What is produced or ex-
pressed? How does it shape the space around it? How
are the flows and relationships regulated? Are certain
bodies invested with more power (capacity to act, to af-
fect and be affected) than others? Where are forces and
relations at work that produce something new?
Following the concept of assemblage means to study
media without being media-centric (Slack, 2012, p. 155).
The concept of assemblages also offers a more complex
understanding of power and enables us to do both, map-
ping what becomes stuck or fixed, what is of flux and in-
flow, and what emerges as new potentials (Coleman &
Ringrose, 2013, p. 9).
4. Working with Affect in Media and Communication
Studies
For media and communication studies, working with af-
fect can take place on different levels. The next sec-
tion will outline three levels which open up new angles
for research.
4.1. Affects Expressed by Media
Firstly, we can focus on affects themselves, as expressed
bymedia. “We appear to consume nothing other than af-
fects”, philosopher Claire Colebrook (2011, p. 51) points
out. For her, media are prime examples where “affects
themselves aremarketed” (Colebrook, 2011, p. 45). Simi-
larly, for Steven Shaviro, media are machines for generat-
ing affect and for capitalizing upon affect (Shaviro, 2010,
p. 3). I call this ‘affective work’ that media perform (Hipfl,
2014): in a time where, following Deleuze, the modula-
tion of affect has become one of the key means of sus-
taining power relations in contemporary so-called ‘con-
trol societies’. Media can touch us, they can move us,
they can make us feel. As Shaviro (2010, p. 2) points out,
media “can give voice (or better sounds and images) to a
kind of ambient, free-floating sensibility that permeates
our society”.
Another way of describing this is that media can be
seen as ‘blocs of sensations’ that according to Deleuze,
consist of affects and percepts (Colebrook, 2002, p. 148).
What does this mean? Whereas affections and percep-
tions are located in perceivers—we can say that one has
a ‘perception’ of red or that one ‘feels’ fear—art andme-
dia create affects and percepts that are not located in a
point of view. When we take the photograph Migrant
Crossing by Vadim Girda (2017) that was awarded the
second prize of the World Press Photo Award of 2017 as
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an example, we understand that this photo is able to cap-
ture a particular quality of social experience and what it
feels like to be in a specific situation. The image shows
refugees crossing the Mala Reka river, near the Greek
border town of Idomeni, expressing their pain and de-
spair. We may not be depressed or terrified when we
view this photograph, but it presents the ‘affect’ of de-
pression or terror. Colebrook (2002, p. xx) uses the ex-
ample of a novel that describes a certain light; we may
not see the light, but we are presented with what it
would be to perceive such light or what such a percep-
tion is regardless ofwho perceives it; this is a percept. So,
media are expressive of these ‘blocs of sensation’, which
is something Raymond Williams (1978) also discussed
with his concept ‘structures of feeling’—his name for
a collective feeling (not something private or idiosyn-
cratic) that emerges and is being taken up andmade pal-
pable first by art and media. Williams illustrates this in
his book The Long Revolution (1961), where he discusses
‘instability and debt’ as the collective mood that charac-
terizes the conditions of existence of the middle class in
popular fiction of the 1840s. This collective mood goes
beyond and cannot be reduced to the ideals and val-
ues of that time, which were piety, thrift, and sobriety
(Williams, 1961).
Following Williams, we are asked to not only analyze
media representations but also what he calls “elements
of impulse, restraints, and tone” (Williams, 1978, p. 132),
those expressive aspects that reveal a certain collective
feeling in media. Martin Barker, for example, discusses
the cycle of films from 2003 to 2006 about the Iraq War
as responses to the ‘Iraq crisis’ in the US (Barker, 2011).
Deidre Pribram (2013) focuses on TV crime series which
express certain structures of feeling that co-exist in the
US. While CSI expresses a sense of speed, efficacy and
rationality that results in a belief in a world we can still
control, Cold Case produces an overall feeling of loss. Bev-
erly Best makes the argument that reality TV expresses
“responsibilization as the neoliberal common sense” and
“individuality and self-expression” (Best, 2012, p. 200). In
my own analysis of Austrian films focusing on migration,
precariousness is one of the central structures of feeling
expressed by the figure of the female migrant from East-
ern Europe (Hipfl, 2016, 2018). In her research on Twit-
ter as affective publics, Zizi Papacharissi is interested in
“how structures of feeling are both rendered and reor-
ganized by the soft and networked architectures of on-
line media” (2015b, p. 5). All these examples illustrate
how such media-generated affects can both consolidate
and reinforce a particular collective feeling and articulate
something new that is emerging.
There is a danger that this approach can result in
“reading affect off of texts”, an approach Grossberg
(2016, p. 1004) problematizes, since structure of feeling
is, as he points out, “less a tool of textual analysis than of
contextualization” (Grossberg, 2016, p. 1026). This may
be an attempt to get an idea of the force of affects, but
this does not yet include how affect as intensity impinges
on bodies, that is how we are affected. This leads us to
the second level of researching affect in media and com-
munication studies.
4.2. Affections: Being Affected and the Capacity to Affect
Everyone is able to recall experiences of having been af-
fected by certain encounters with media (music, novels,
films, YouTube videos, hashtags, etc.) which they have
found moving, astounding, irritating, or which have cre-
ated an impulse to do something. What happened then
was a transition from one state of the body’s capacities
to another. As Massumi (2015) points out, this transition
is felt on two levels which are connected: the feeling of
the quality of the experience and the increased or dimin-
ished capacity to act. Massumi (2015, pp. 60–61) also
talks about affect as “microshocks”, which he describes
as small changes in focus or attention (interruptions,
ruptures). These ‘microshocks’ are happening all the
time in our life. They can result in ‘microperceptions’—
when something is perceived as being qualitatively dif-
ferent, but without it being consciously registered. It
is the felt interruption, a cut in the continuity of re-
lation that includes the potential of a re-relating with
a difference (Massumi, 2015, p. 54). What happens in
these ‘microshocks’ is that past occasions and experi-
ences are fused or contrasted, resulting in certain ten-
dencies of the body towards the future. Depending on
these tendencies or habits of the body (when certain pro-
cesses repeat themselves and function, and we are not
very attentive to them) certain movements are “more
or less acceptable, more or less ready to go” (Massumi,
2015, p. 50).
This is also an explanation for differences in being af-
fected that exist in people when they are ‘shocked’ by
certain events, encounters. They differ in their attune-
ment, they are affected differently. At the same time, we
can witness again and again emerging conformity in the
attunements—often as effects of being targeted affec-
tively and strategically (in politics, activism). Here, Sara
Ahmed’s concept of stickiness (Ahmed, 2004, pp. 11, 13),
where different elements (figures) are stuck together,
can be employed:when certain emotions are attached to
certain bodies, which then circulate in public space, this
combination becomes more intense, blocks other con-
nections and can even appear as a stable configuration.
One of Ahmed’s examples is hate against asylum and mi-
gration, wheremigrants and asylum seekers become per-
ceived as a national threat.
There is a growing body of work on affection in me-
dia and communication studies. Besides Papacharissi’s
(2015a) impressive study on ‘affective publics’, Danish re-
searchers Carsten Stage and Britta Timm Knudsen have
been exploring, in particular, how we are targeted affec-
tively and strategically by mediated bodily vulnerability
(e.g., Timm Knudsen & Stage, 2015a, 2015b). In a current
project, Margreth Lünenborg and Claudia Töpper (n.d.)
analyse the affection potential of reality TV formats.
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4.3. Exploring Assemblages
In each assemblage, different elements are brought to-
gether in a particular way so that it expresses a character
and creates a territory. Macgregor Wise (2012, p. 159)
stresses that “any assemblage we enter into puts us into
a particular relation to the world—promises us particu-
lar powers, redefines who we think we are or could be”
(Wise, 2012, p. 159).Wise also points out thatwe have to
ask what an assemblage does: “how it shapes the space
around it, transforms behaviour, moulds attention, dis-
tracts, focuses” (Wise, 2012, p. 161). Every time,weuse a
device, such as a cell-phone, we also connect with other
assemblages—when we post a tweet we connect with
the assemblages of language and technology that make
certain statements possible (in the case of Twitter, how-
ever, this is restricted to 140 characters).
We can approach, for example, the selfie as an as-
semblage, as Aaron Hess (2015) suggests. He discusses
the selfie as an assemblage as an articulation of at least
four elements: the self, the physical space (which can
be a public or private space), the device, and the net-
work. Starting with the photograph, Hess points out that
selfies “accent the self” (Hess, 2015, p. 1632), they pre-
sume a sense of authenticity, even though they are
staged performances. Selfies are taken with cell phones,
which make use of filters, photo-shop or other digital
means to manipulate the image. Selfies are perceived
as spontaneously taken, even though they have to be
choreographed and performed. Selfies are authenticat-
ing, they give a sense of, “this is me, right here, right
now” (Hess, 2015, p. 1633). Selfies are also expressive of
the relationship to space and place; more precisely, they
are about the subject’s placement in a certain place at
a certain time. According to De Souza e Silva and Sutko,
this results in double perception of space, which is an
example of what the selfie assemblage does: “[u]sers si-
multaneously see their physical surrounding space, plus
a representation of that same spacemappedon theirmo-
bile phone” (quoted in Hess, 2015, p. 1636). Users are in-
vited to consider their composition in space for sharing in
their networks. Taking a selfie also illustrates the connec-
tion of body and technology. Holding the device at arm’s
length brings the material dimension into play: a certain
angle and perspective are required to produce a selfie
that will be well received by the audience. Another con-
nection made is the articulation with the network: com-
pared to photos taken with digital cameras, selfies are
particularly easy to share via social networking sites. As
Hess makes the point, when we upload the photo “we
express a desire to be recognized at this material mo-
ment…and understood as members of a networked com-
munity” (Hess, 2015, pp. 1640–1641).
Hess’ last argument in his insightful analysis of selfie
assemblages can be used to draw attention to the energy
that comes from such desires. It is exactly these forces of
desire that hold the assemblage together, preventing it
from breaking down and dissipating. At the same time,
we cannot control what kind of new connections will be
made. When selfies are uploaded, they are public and
can become subject to appropriation, misinterpretation,
and new articulations.
5. Challenges and New Paths for Doing Research on
Affect
The overall argument of this article is that a Deleuze-
Guattarian understanding of affect is productive for com-
munication and media studies for two reasons: it shifts
our thinking from well-trodden paths focusing on rep-
resentation to a more complex approach that is better
suited to grasp contemporary processes and phenom-
ena of media-communication, characterized by connec-
tions and relations. It sensitizes us towards what is to
come, to new potentials and openings. Notwithstanding,
researching affect in media and communication studies
certainly has its methodological challenges (e.g., Cole-
man & Ringrose, 2013; Timm Knudsen & Stage, 2015c).
However, a Deleuze-Guattarian understanding of affect
also leads us towards new paths for research. Here just
two aspects are addressed which are of particular rele-
vance. The first is the question regarding the methods
that would enable us to grasp affect(ions), whereas the
second points towards ethical concerns.
When researching affect(ions), we need methods
that are sensitive to the dynamics, flows, and processes
of becoming that characterize theworld. John Law (2004)
speaks of reality as messy and problematizes method-
ologies which try to convert this messiness into some-
thing smooth and coherent. This is, for example, the
case with traditional forms of ‘coding’ in research, which
are examples of territorialisation. They make cuts into
flows to produce systems of meaning and order. Ac-
cording to MacLure (2013, p. 168), “things are frozen in
the places allotted to them” by certain structures. We
need to be aware that methods are performative, that
they do something. Traditional coding does not allow for
‘difference’ in the sense that something emerges—the
difference is only “represented in terms of static rela-
tions among already-formed entities that are described
as different” (MacLure, 2013, p. 169). But there is al-
ways something that escapes and exceeds our coding
(see MacLure, 2013, pp. 167, 169).
MacLure (2013, pp. 170–172) suggests one option,
which is to follow Kathleen Stewart’s approach to pay at-
tention to those phenomena that are often overlooked in
qualitative research: the anecdotal, accidental, and con-
tingent. This is a call to focus on those fragments of data
that do not fit into neat and succinct codes, and also to
listen to our ‘gut feelings’ and to ‘moments of discon-
certion’. MacLure’s (2013, p. 180) recommendation is to
change our understanding of coding towards “an ongo-
ing construction of a cabinet of curiosities orwunderkam-
mer”. Cabinets of curiosities were collections of all sorts
of different things like strange objects, stuffed animals,
mechanical toys etc., assembled by princes, scholars, and
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merchants during the 16th and 17th century in Europe.
As MacLure (2013, p. 180) points out, these cabinets ex-
hibit the logic of an assemblage (the arrangement of het-
erogeneous elements) and are seen and discussed as a
form of inquiry, as a form of ‘experiment with order and
disorder’. FollowingMacLure (2013, p. 181), coding could
be thought of as such an experiment, where provisional
and partial taxonomies are formed but are always sub-
ject to change. This would then be an ongoing practice of
‘making sense’ whichwould include openings forwonder
(as temporary points of indecision).
Such an approach allows us to take into account the
actual and the virtual as two modalities of reality that
co-exist. We are asked not only to capture what is go-
ing on in a specific situation but also what is beyond this
situation. This is a requirement that is discussed as ‘in-
ventivemethods’. Rebecca Coleman and Jessica Ringrose
(2013, pp. 7–8) give a good summary of the arguments
of Lury andWakeford, andMassumi, respectively. One of
the ways in which social science might expand the actual
by including the virtual as the openness towards a mul-
tiplicity of actualizations is an “attention to that which
has conventionally escaped or troubled social science—
the virtual, the affective, the ephemeral” (Coleman &
Ringrose, 2013, p. 8). Following Massumi, an inventive
methodology is to notice and bring about ‘more of the
world’ and not ‘more of the same’. This means that we
should be sensitive to the contingent openings where
one actuality transforms into another. And that we are
prompted to create research environments that allow
us to explore the “unstableness of everyday life” (Cole-
man& Ringrose, 2013, p. 28), the processes of territorial-
isation, re- and de-territorialisation which show us how
power works by trying to stabilize and fix some assem-
blages, prevent the plug-ins of different assemblages,
but also enable new conditions of possibility and the
emergence of new connections.
Last, but not least, the ethical question needs to be
addressed. Affect is not something that is positive or neg-
ative, per se, rather it is the question of what affects do.
Do they increase or diminish the capacities to act, or to
connect? This is a question which researchers are forced
to ask themselves because as researchers we are entan-
gled with the assemblages that we study. We are as re-
searchers “one point of the relations within an assem-
blage” (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013, p. 6). As Karen Barad
(quoted in Coleman & Ringrose, 2013, p. 6) stresses, re-
searchers are responsible for the ‘cuts’ they make in the
practice of boundary making. And we need to be aware
of what we are doing with our research. In which ways
are the capacities of bodies that we are engaged with,
diminished or enhanced through our research?
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